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War Office, 31st May, 1916.

The following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Major-General Sir Charles M. Dobell, K.C.B. Commanding the allied Forces in the Cameroons:-

General Headquarters, Cameroons,

1st March, 1916.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith a summary of the operations carried out by the Allied force under my command, covering the period between the capitulation of Duala, 27th September, 1914, and the termination of active operations.

I have, in this despatch, endeavoured to maintain in a correct perspective, remembering that our operations in this theatre of war are incomparable in magnitude to those taking place elsewhere. For purposes of comparison I may, however, add that the number of troops of both nations at my immediate disposal at the commencement of the campaign amounted to 4,300 West African native soldiers; on the 21st November, 1915, this number had been increased to 9,700, including Indian troops. In these numbers the British and French forces were approximately equal.

As Your Lordship is aware, I have kept the proper authorities informed in some detail as to the proceedings and progress of the troops under my command. These despatches I have endeavoured to forward at intervals of about a fortnight; I do not, therefore, propose to enlarge on such questions as the organization and preparation of

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the force placed at my disposal, nor the naval measures that were taken in a campaign to which the adjective "Amphibious" may be applied in its widest sense. It is perhaps sufficient to state I fully realized, that the conquest of a country which is some 306 000 square miles in area, or roughly one and a half times the size of the German Empire, defended by a well-led and well-trained native force, plentifully supplied with machine guns was no light task.

2. On my passage from the United Kingdom early in September 1914, I learnt at various ports of call that the operations which had taken place on the Niger an frontier had not been as successful as had been anticipated, thus confirming my opinion that Duala, the capital and chief port of the Cameroons, must be made my immediate objective. I entertained no doubt as to the ability of the Royal Navy to overcome the difficulties and make a landing at Duala feasible, and my best hopes were realised when I was informed that H.M.S. "Challenger" could force a passage through the sunken wrecks and other obstructions in the Cameroon River, and reach a point 7,000 yards from the town. This was made possible owing to the mine sweeping and other preparatory work which had been carried out by the Royal Navy and Nigeria Marine, under the direction of Captain Fuller, R.N., H.M.S. "Cumberland."

On my summons for the surrender of the Colony being refused, and after duly notifying the German Commandant of my intention, I ordered a bombardment of the town to commence early on 26th September; this in combination with a land demonstration made by way of one of the neighbouring creeks, was sufficient to induce the Commandant, on 27th September, to surrender the towns of Duala and Bonaberi, with a small strip of land in their environs. The surrender of Duala secured us a safe and convenient base for the future absorption of German territory; further, the capture of stores, supplies, field guns, and the removal of over 400 German Europeans was a great loss to the German Field Force, whilst the seizure of the large amount

of shipping and numerous small craft in the harbour, was an inestimable advantage to us.

3. My first object was to consolidate the position already won, and with this object in view an Allied force was allotted the task of clearing the country up to and including the Japoma Bridge, Midland Railway, whilst a British force commenced to make headway towards Maka on the Northern Railway line. Reconnaissances by land and water were carried out with uniformly successful results. I may remark incidentally that neither the climate nor the character of the country favoured the offensive, officers and men were exposed to the most trying conditions - incessant tropical rains, absence of roads or even paths, a country covered with the densest African forest - all contributed to the difficulties with which the troops were faced. Had it not been for the existing railways which formed a line of advance as well as supply, it is difficult to see how progress could have been made.

The country in the immediate vicinity of Duala is perhaps typical of the greater portion of the Cameroons in which my troops have operated, excepting beyond Northern railhead where the country becomes open and, on account of its greater altitude, healthier, but all the coast line, and for some 150 miles inland, one meets the same monotonous impenetrable African forest fringed, on the coast line, by an area of mangroves swamp in varying depth. The zone is well watered by numerous rivers of which the Wuri, Sanaga and Njong present serious military obstacles. Once outside this belt conditions change at once, supplies and live stock are obtainable, and open grass lands are reached; the once unusual geographical one? feature is the Cameroon Mountain, some 13,000 feet high, which rises abruptly from the sea, its slopes clothed with valuable plantations, and on which the hill station of Buea, the former administrative capital of the Protectorate, is perched.

4. By the first week in October we had made good the country as far as Waka and the left bank of the Dibamba creek. The Japoma railway bridge, 900 yards in length was broken in two places, but a fine feat was performed by the French tirailleurs in forcing this passage under a galling rifle and machine-gun fire. The Royal Navy and Royal Marine Light Infantry also materially contributed to this success.

J now judged that J could move a force by the Wuri River on Jabassi, so as to secure Duala from any attack from the north-east; a mixed Naval and Military force, supported by armed craft, was organized and an attack was delivered on 8th October. It is regrettable that this operation was not at first successful, difficult country, novel conditions and the fact that our native troops encountered machine-gun fire for the first time are contributory causes to failure, nevertheless it became necessary completely to reorganize the force and repeat the operation, with the result that Jabassi was taken on 14th October. From this place a force was pushed out to Njamtan and the country around Jabassi was cleared of the enemy.

My next objective was Edea, on which place J determined an advance should be made from three directions, two by land and one by river. Strong forces were moved from Japoma and by the Njong River to Dehane, thence by a track towards Edea. The third force proceeded by the Sanaga River; the navigation of this river is most difficult, dangerous bars hinder entrance into its mouth and sand banks obstruct the passage up to Edea. The feat performed by Commander L.W. Braithwaite, R.N., in navigating an armed flotilla on the Sanaga was a remarkable one. Thus the combined movement, outlined above, was entirely successful and Edea, was occupied on the morning of 26th October. This result had not been achieved without hard fighting, particularly on the part of the force operating by the line of the railway. It was during the preliminary operations

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performed

in this undertaking that Lieutenant Child, Director of Nigeria Marine, Commander Gray, and Captain Franquerville, of the French Army, lost their lives through the capsizing of their boat in the surf at the mouth of the Njong River -valuable lives whose losses it was difficult to replace.

5. During the latter half of October the small force under Lieut.-Colonel Haywood was continuously engaged with the enemy on the line of the Northern Railway, but had made such good progress that I was in a position to arrange for an attack on Victoria, Soppo, and Buea. As in previous operations I divided my force, part of which was moved by water to Tiko, part from Susa by Mpundu on the Mungo River, and the third portion supplied by the Royal Navy and Royal Marine Light Infantry moved by sea to Victoria. The opposition met with cannot be described as serious, but the country was very trying to troops; the energy with which our advantage was pushed appeared to demoralise the Germans, and by the 15th November we had secured Buea, with Soppo and Victoria. We inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy whilst escaping very lightly ourselves.

With the double object of striking an effectice blow at the enemy and at the same time relieving the pressure on the southern frontier of Nigeria I decided to clear the whole of the Northern Railway of the enemy, and for this purpose concentrated a force at Mujuka, under command of Colonel Gorges, on 30th November. This force gradually fought its way to the North and reached Nkongsamba (railhead), which was surrendered to us on 10th December. It is worthy of remark that we took two airplanes at this place -the first machines that had ever arrived in West Africa. The advance was continued to Dschang, which was occupied on 3rd January, and the fort destroyed; most of the hostile resistance was met with at the Nkam River, but our columns rarely remained unmolested and experienced difficulties in operating in a class of country totally different to that to which they had by then become accustomed. I decided, as

soon as the fort at Dschang had been destroyed, that the place should be evacuated and Nkongssamba, with its outpost at Bare, should be our most advanced position. It was unfortunate that we could not continue to hold Dschang as our withdrawal gave a false impression to the natives and emboldened the enemy. However, with the troops at my disposal I did not feel strong enough to maintain and supply a post, 55 miles north of railhead, in a difficult and mountainous country.

6. Early in 1915 the situation was as follows:-

British troops holding Duala, the Northern Railway with Bare, Victoria and Dibombe (a defended post south-west of Jabassi).

French troops on the line of the Midland Railway up to and including Edea, which place was partially isolated as one span of the first of the two bridges had been destroyed. A detachment at Kribi was protecting that seaport from land attack.

Ships and armed craft of the Allied Navies had visited the whole of the Cameroons sea board and had established bases for small craft to patrol the rivers where navigable.

By this time approximately 1,000 male Europeans, only 32 of whom were incapable of bearing arms, had been deported for internment in Europe.

Towards the end of 1914 the French, under General Aymerich, and Belgian troops based on French Equatorial Africa, commenced to make their presence felt in the South and South-East, but my force was separated from them by a distance of approximately 400 miles.

In the North an Allied force was fully occupied in observing Hora and Garua.

At and near Ossidinge a small British force from Nigeria and German forces were in contact.

Notwithstanding the number of troops, British, French and Belgian, in the country it was impossible at this period to co-ordinate their movements, owing to the vastness of the area over which they were scattered and the impossibility of establishing any means of

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intercommunication between the various Commanders. Furthermore, it was difficult for me to pursue a very active policy, as it was necessary to maintain comparatively strong garrisons in the places already occupied. Posts on our lines of communication were also absorbing troops from my somewhat depleted force, amongst which sickness was beginning to play its part.

7. It was on the 5th January that the German Commander endeavoured to deliver a serious blow to the French force commanded by Colonel Mayer. Two practically simultaneous attacks were made against his force; the first at Kopongo, on the railway, the second at Edea. I had obtained some knowledge of the German Commander's intention, and the post at Kopongo had been slightly augmented, with the happy result that the attack on this point was easily repulsed. but not until the railway and telegraph lines had both been cut and all communication with Edea severed. The troops at Edea had, however, to bear the brunt of a more serious movement. The locality of Edea is by no means easy to defend owing to the proximity of the forest, the scattered nature of the buildings, and inequality of the ground; but so skilfully were the defences devised, and so good was the French marksmanship, that at the termination of the combat the Germans left on the field 23 Europeans dead and 190 native soldiers killed and wounded. The French loss consisted of 1 European sergeant and 3 tirailleurs killed and 11 tirailleurs wounded. A machine gun, number of rifles, ammunition and equipment fell into the French hands. It is significant that this was the first and last occasion on which the Germans attempted an operation of this nature on a comparatively large scale.

Towards the end of January, Lieut.-Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Cunliffe arrived at Duala on a mission from Lagos, and as a result of a conference it was agreed that a more active prosecution of the campaign in the Northern Cameroons should be undertaken. I detached Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) W.D. Wright, V.C. a most able
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officer, from the Staff of the British Contingent under my command and placed his services at the disposal of the Officer Commanding the Allied Forces at Garua. I also arranged with Captain Fuller, R.H., for the despatch of a naval field gun to Yola, via the Niger and Benue Rivers, for eventual use against the forts at Garua.

The early days of February were marked by great hostile activity in the neighbourhood of Northern railhead. Lieut.-Colonel Cockburn, commanding a battalion of the Nigeria Regiment, had a serious encounter with the enemy at Mbereku on the morning of the 3rd February resulting in the capture of the hostile camp, a large quantity of small arm ammunition, and equipment. We were, however, unable to reap the full advantage of our success as Lieut.-Colonel Cockburn was obliged to transfer his force to the neighbourhood of Hermann's Farm, where the Sierra Leone Battalion was engaged with the enemy. During these two incidents we lost nearly 120 native soldiers, killed wounded or missing; but after we had consolidated our position at Bare, the enemy did not follow up the slight advantage he had gained.

Constant activity during February had failed to gain for us any material advantage to the north of the railway, and there were a series of small incidents which culminated in the second attack by our troops on the points now as Stoebel's and Hermann's Farms on 4th March. I regret that this attack was not successful and we lost some valuable lives, including Major (Lieut.-Colonel) O.P. Newstead, commanding the Sierra Leone Battalion, an officer of great promise. The enemy must, however, have suffered in a similar degree, as it was later found that he had evacuated his defensive position and retired further north.

During February I received valuable reinforcements from French and British West African Colonies, and I was enabled to reconstitute my force and place a more homogeneous unit at the disposal of Lieut.-Colonel R.A. de B. Rose, commanding the Gold Coast Regiment.

8. On the 12th March a mission from French Equatorial Africa, at the head of which was Monsieur Fourneau, Lieutenant-Gouverneur du Moyen Congo, reached Duala. Its object was to invite my co-operation in an immediate advance in conjunction with the troops under General Aymerich from south-east, and against Jaunde. Since the occupation of Duala, Jaunde had been transformed into the temporary seat of the Colonial Administration. I fully realised the political and strategic importance of Jaunde, but demurred embarking on such an operation at that moment. It was late in the season and the rains were already beginning, besides which the troops I was able to employ were insufficient to ensure success in the absence of effective co-operation, in the immediate vicinity of Jaunde, by the troops under General Aymerich. Owing to the difficulty of communication it was quite unsafe to count on this. However, in view of the great advantage which would follow an early occupation of Jaunde, I consented to co-operate with all my available strength, and the 20th April was fixed as the date on which an advance should be made from the line Ngwe-So Dibanga, on the Kele River. I consequently entrained a British force, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Haywood, on 7th April, which was to commence a methodical advance in co-operation with the French troops under Colonel Hayer. The forcing of the line of the Kele River and the position at Ngwe, both ^{of} which places were obstinately defended, occasioned my troops some losses. I further found it necessary to despatch a force to Sakbajeme to deny the crossing of the Sanaga River at that place to the enemy. It soon became evident X that the enemy was withdrawing troops from other and more distant parts of the Colony to resist our further advance.

At midnight 23rd/24th April the blockade of the Cameroons was declared, and every artifice was used to deceive the enemy, and incessant and unremitting activity was maintained by the Royal Navy on the coast line, so as to induce the enemy to believe that disembarkation would be made at a point from which a force could be march-

ed on Jaunde. Campo had been occupied by a Naval detachment, and boat patrol of the river as far as Dipikar was maintained.

The advance from the line already mentioned was subsequently postponed till 1st May, on which date the French and British columns moved forward to make good Eseka and Num Biagas respectively.

The French advance on Eseka was conducted with some difficulty, as broken bridges denied them the use of the railway line for supply trains. Commandant Mechet, who conducted the advance, successfully overcame all difficulties and, after being seriously opposed at Sende, reached Eseka on 11th May.

Turning to the British advance, on 1st May Lieutenant-Colonel Haywood recommenced his march eastwards from Ngwe, and driving in the hostile outposts at Ndupe, on the 3rd May his force was facing the formidable position which the enemy had established on the left bank of the Mbila River at Num Biagas. We captured the position on 4th May, but not without serious losses in European officers.

A warm tribute is due to the bravery and steadiness displayed by our Native troops, and to the pluck and endurance of the European ranks in face of such stubborn resistance.

As previously arranged, the French force at Eseka now moved north and joined the British at Num Biagas, and Colonel Mayer left Idea to assume command of the Allied expedition. Stores and supplies were pushed forward by road, and a naval 12-pounder gun was despatched to reinforce our artillery.

Owing to the heavy casualties which had occurred in the ranks of the two battalions of the Nigeria Regiment and the inability of Nigeria, owing to the many calls made by General Cunliffe's troops, to supply me with trained soldiers, I decided towards the end of May to establish a training depot at Duala. The recruits were enlisted in Nigeria, and transferred to Duala for training. This proved a great success, and by its means 536 soldiers were trained and passed into the ranks.

9. On 11th May J received a message from the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, which informed me that the progress of the troops under General Aymerich had not been as rapid as expected, and that as neither Dume or Lomie had been captured, no definite date could be given for the advance from those places. As J realised that the advance on Jaunde, if delayed for any length of time, would be seriously interfered with by the rains, and the sickness among both Europeans and natives, which was already causing me some anxiety would rapidly increase, J instructed Colonel Mayer to push on with all vigour, in consequence of which he left Num Biagas on 25th May.

J regret that supply difficulties soon made themselves evident, the country was barren, and with all available carriers and the few motor vehicles at my disposal, at that time only three, J was unable to transport food for Europeans and natives with sufficient rapidity. Handicapped by the almost impenetrable bush and a terrain which offered many defensive positions, the advance became exceedingly slow. At every turn of the road the advance was met by machine-gun fire, so that during the 25th and 26th May only 5 miles was made good. It took two days to force the enemy from Njok. The enemy evidently had received reinforcements and commenced to interfere with our line of communication, which was peculiarly susceptible to attack, while the long convoys of carriers were singularly prone to panic. J received an appeal from Colonel Mayer for reinforcements, as in addition to other disabilities dysentery had broken out in his force. J sent forward such troops as were available and took measures to obtain more carriers from the West African Colonies.

From 31st May till 4th June Colonel Mayer was held up at a position at Matem, which presented more than usual difficulties owing to the swamps, which rendered a turning movement impossible. By the 5th June only 12 miles from Num Biagas had been made good. About this date Colonel Mayer informed me that owing to sickness, especially amongst

amongst Europeans, and to the stubborn resistance of the enemy, he was of opinion that the further advance of his column on Jaunde was impracticable, and he proposed, pending further instructions, to establish himself on the Puge River, where he could await the approach of General Aymerich's troops. I immediately informed the Governor General of Equatorial Africa of the situation, adding that unless he had recent news of General Aymerich's advance I should be obliged to withdraw Colonel Mayer's force to the line of the Kele River. On 7th June Governor-General Lerlin informed me by telegraph that he had received no further news from the Southern Cameroons. I thereupon decided to withdraw our force to the Ndupe River preparatory to holding a line So Dibanga-Ngwe. A serious attack on one of our convoys of 500 carriers, and the consequent loss of food supplies, decided Colonel Mayer to retire without further delay. During the 16th and 17th June our rearguards were harassed, but never broken, and the enemy suffered considerably in his attacks. I deemed it advisable to send forward a reinforcement of the last troops at my disposal so that the pressure on our withdrawal could be relieved; these troops, after leaving Duala on the morning of the 15th June, bivouacked the following day at Ngui, 35 miles beyond Edea, having completed much of the distance in heavy tropical rains. On the following morning, after resuming their march, they reached Colonel Mayer's column at a most opportune moment during a heavy attack on the rearguard. Not till 28th June did the hostile activity cease, when our posts were firmly established at Ngwe and on the Kel River at So Dibanga. In comparison to the size of our force the casualties were serious, 25 per cent, being either killed or wounded. I regret that this operation was not more fruitful in results, and I fully recognise the fact that Colonel Mayer was not in a position to undertake, singlehanded, an advance on Jaunde, but I had hoped that the pressure that was being brought on the hostile forces in the Southern Cameroons would have^{had} the effect of preventing a con-

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centration against us.

During this period our troops near Northern Railhead were not in a position to undertake any serious offensive action.

10. There was now an unavoidable lull in the operations caused by the rains. J seized this opportunity to send as many British officers and non-commissioned officers as possible to the United Kingdom for a few weeks' rest, and J arranged that most of the native troops from Nigeria and the Gold Coast should, in turn, visit their own Colonies. J managed, however, to send detachments to operate near the Njong and Campo Rivers respectively. A French detachment from Ngwe also carried out a successful reconnaissance in July.

It was on 25th and 26th August, 1915, at a conference which took place at Duala between Governor-General Merlin, General Aymerich, and myself, that the plan was decided on by which the Cameroons was eventually conquered.

The fall of Garua, in the north, early in June enabled a British and French force to be set free which could move through the highlands of the Cameroons to the south.

General Aymerich, whose troops were now established at Bertua and Dume, promised definite co-operation, with Jaunde, as before, the objective, whilst a force under Lieut.-Colonel le Meillour moved parallel to the eastern frontier of Muni, and was to cross the Campo River and move in the direction of Ebolowa. It was also arranged that J should show such activity as was possible from Northern Railhead so as to assist the British force at Ossidinge in its attempt to link up with other troops from Nigeria, and further that a force should land at Campo and move parallel to the northern frontier of Spanish Guinea.

It was unfortunate that Brigadier-General Cunliffe was unable to attend this conference, but all details were communicated to him, and he was asked to exercise all possible pressure from the north. His role was most admirably carried out.

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The arrival of the 5th Light Infantry of the India Army strengthened my command, and further reinforcements from French West Africa were promised. The General Officer Commanding at Freetown and the Governors of Nigeria and the Gold Coast agreed to send me the carriers I required and to maintain them by monthly drafts. It was thanks to these officers that, in spite of a rather heavy sick roll among carriers, an efficient transport service was maintained throughout. My requirements in motor transport were also met; this service proved invaluable and far exceeded my expectations. Thus by 22nd September preparations were sufficiently far advanced for a move to be made in an easterly direction. Many of the earlier operations were a repetition of those which had taken place in May and June, but the general plan differed in so much that I arranged for the British and French lines of supply to be kept distinct, whilst I also determined that Eseka should be made the French advanced base from which operations could be carried forward to the Jaunde-Kribi road, and that our general advance should be carried out by means of parallel columns by road and railway. Our communications needed much repair, including the total reconstruction of a heavy railway bridge and a deviation necessitating considerable labour on earthwork. Many other smaller bridges were broken or destroyed, those on the road were made fit for heavy traffic, those on the railway were practically rebuilt.

The British force, as previously, experienced stiff resistance at Num Biagas, but on 9th October that place was captured after a lively action, in which the Nigerian and Gold Coast troops once more distinguished themselves. From here we were enabled to send out flanking columns and render some assistance to the French troops who were fighting their way to Eseka. The Kele River, in flood, proved a formidable obstacle and its crossing somewhat delayed the British flanking columns sent out from Num Biagas. Sende was occupied by the French on 25th October, and the enemy was driven from Eseka on 30th

October. Considerable rolling stock, left behind after our previous advance, was retaken, and proved a valuable addition to our exiguous supply of engines and wagons. By 23rd November, both British and French forces were ready for the final advance, the bush track from Edea to Wum Biagas had been converted into a good motor road, and through railway communication, Duala-Eseka, was nearing completion. There were also over 7,000 carriers employed on such sections of the communications as were still unfit for motor or rail traffic. Dschang Mangas was selected as the primary objective of the British force, whilst the French were directed to make good the line of the Jaunde - Kribi road. Both forces slightly modified their tactics and the advance was generally carried out by a main body, with two wings moving on as wide a front as the nature of the country permitted. The method of our advance appears to have entirely disconcerted the enemy and, although he still continued strenuously to resist our advance, it became apparent that his strength was gradually becoming exhausted. Towards the end of November the fighting in and around Lesogs by the troops under Lieut.-Colonel Cockburn was of a very severe nature, but the troops from the Northern Provinces of Nigeria gallantly rose to the occasion and, despite, all difficulties of the country, were not to be denied in their endeavour to dislodge the enemy. Much credit is due to these troops and their leaders for the admirable conduct of this operation. Ngung was reached on the 30th November, and, up to this place, every defensive position was disputed by the enemy. On 7th December the advance of Dschang Mangas was continued and both main and flank columns were subject to opposition. A well executed move by a small force of the Gold Coast Regiment, under Captain Butler, V.C., considerably disturbed the enemy, the capture of one of his machine-guns and several thousand round of ammunition, in addition to important documents, produced considerable effect. On 17th December the more open and cultivated country was reached and we took Dschang Mangas.

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From 26th November onwards the French were fighting their way through very broken country to Mangleles; they had to face determined opposition and lost a considerable number of European and native soldiers, but their tenacity of purpose was rewarded by the capture of Mangleles on 21st December, after intermittent fighting covering a period of five days. The column halted at this place for rest and to establish a supply depot.

11. J must now indicate the turn that events had taken beyond Northern Railhead. J was informed from Nigeria that the British force at Ossidinge, under Major Crookenden, would be prepared to move on Bamenda on 12th October. J therefore ordered a force consisting of portions of the West African Regiment, 5th Light Infantry, and some artillery, under Lieut.-Colonel Cotton, 5th Light Infantry, to move on Dschang from Bare, also starting on 12th October. Hostile opposition was experienced at Mwu and Nkam Rivers and from an entrenched position at Sanschu. On 6th November Dschang was occupied. On receipt of information that Major Crookenden's force had reached Bamenda on 22nd October J ordered Lieut.-Colonel Cotton to leave a garrison in Dschang and move a force to Bagam to co-operate with Major Crookenden in an attack on that place. The enemy had, however, forestalled us and withdrawn to Fumban, whither we pursued him after experiencing some difficulty in affecting the crossing of the Kun River. On 2nd December the important centre of Fumban was occupied and an abortive effort of the enemy to retake it was frustrated. Brigadier-General Cunliffe, foreseeing the possibility of obstinate resistance at Fumban, had directed two other small columns to co-operate in our movement on that place. These columns arrived almost simultaneously with that under Lieut.-Colonel Cotton. Major Crookenden's troops then continued their advance under Brigadier-General Cunliffe's direction, whilst J placed garrisons in Fumban, Bana and Bagam and the bulk of Lieut.-Colonel Cotton's troops returned to railhead. J was thus enabled to withdraw a small force to move
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from Nkongsamba to Jambassi and penetrate the Bafia country, where J still believed there were small hostile parties. J also was enabled to detach a force to assist the French column operating from Campo. J think J may consider our operations in the Northern area were entirely satisfactory, and the simultaneous advance of our columns took the heart out of the remnants of the enemy forces in that district. Furthermore, we had established touch with Brigadier-General Cunliffe's columns, which were now converging on the Sanaga River, at a point known as the Nachtigal Rapids. Our losses were slight and the health of all ranks was considerably better than that of the troops fighting in the lower altitudes.

12. Reverting to the operations of the main forces. On receiving information that the British force had arrived at Dschang Mangas, J decided that it would be more advantageous to move on Jaunde direct, rather than await the French advance to the Jaunde-Kribi road. In arriving at this decision J was influenced by the fact that the mind of the native does not understand the meaning nor necessity of delay, and from a political point of view the early occupation of Jaunde appeared to be all important. From 22nd December, the hostile resistance gradually weakened, strongly entrenched positions were abandoned, and on the morning of the 1st January Colonel Gorges entered Jaunde with his force. The enemy appeared to have completely broken under the pressure which he was now experiencing from all sides. Allied troops from the north, troops from French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo commenced to arrive in Jaunde during the first week in January. It is, J think, a remarkable feat that troops that had fought and marched for a period of seventeen months should have converged on their objective within a few days of one another.

The direct effect of the occupation of Jaunde was to relieve all pressure in front of the French force advancing from Mangeles, the Jaunde-Kribi road being reached early in January. British and

French

French forces were moved during the first week in January to Widenge and in the direction of Ebolowa via Olama and Onana Besa crossings of the Njong River. At Kol Maka, Lieut.-Colonel Haywood succeeded in securing the release of officers, non-commissioned officers, civilian and native non-combatants who had been taken prisoners by the Germans at various times during the war; his force, supported by a strong French column, continued its advance on Ebolowa, on which place a second Allied column was also advancing. A French force under Lieut.-Colonel Faucon occupied Ebolowa on 19th January, after experiencing some slight resistance. The definite move of the remnants of the German forces towards Spanish territory now became apparent, and Lieut.-Colonel Haywood proceeded with all despatch to follow them up as far as Nkan, from which place I diverted him via Efulen on Kribi, in order to clear the western area of stragglers. A British force was also moved to Lolodorf.

Colonel Morrison took command of a strong French force, and, moving towards the Spanish frontier, succeeded in driving the German force in front of him across the Campo river into neutral territory. A similar operation was conducted by the French force which had operated from Campo, so that by the middle of February no Germans were left in the Cameroons, and the Cameroons, and the conquest of the country had been completed.

13. To that able soldier, Colonel Mayer, C.B., French Colonial Infantry, I desire to express my deep indebtedness, not alone for the skilled leading of his troops, but also for the clear and practical manner in which he handled the numerous perplexing problems with which he was confronted. I also desire to bring to Your Lordship's notice the name of Capitaine de Génie Chardy; without the assistance of this talented officer is difficult to imagine how the repair and maintenance of the Chemin de Fer du Centre could have been carried out. To Capitaine Chardy and his subordinates I desire to tender my warmest thanks.

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Capitaine André Charvet, of the French Colonial Infantry, served on my staff for the first year of the war; owing to the depletion in the European ranks of the French force I reluctantly surrendered his services to Colonel Mayer, an action which deprived me of the immediate services of an officer of whose military talent I had formed the highest opinion.

To the battalion and battery commanders and all the leaders in the ranks of our Allies I desire to express my grateful appreciation for the skill, energy and perseverance with which they led their troops. I desire also to pay a just tribute to the Senegalese soldiers, whose salient characteristics are extreme bravery in battle and great cheerfulness in all and every circumstance.

To the officers, petty and non-commissioned officers and men of the Allied Navies, the Royal Marine Light Infantry and Nigerian Marine, I desire to express my admiration of their unremitting and incessant toil. I am not overstating the fact when I say that without their assistance by sea, creek and land, the military forces of the Allies could not have accomplished the task which lay before them. Where so many have done such admirable work it is difficult for me to make an imperial selection, but I desire specially to bring to Your Lordship's notice the valuable services rendered by Capitaine de Vaisseau Carré, who has been Senior Naval Officer during the last eight and a-half months of the operations. He has had not light task in handling the many questions connected with the naval side of the campaign; also the name of Captain Cyril T.M. Fuller, C.M.G., R.N., an officer who combines in one personality administrative ability and qualities of leadership of a high order.

The troops of the West African Frontier Force, with whom I happily was closely connected in peace, have realised my fullest expectations. To them no day appears to be too long, no task too difficult. With a natural aptitude for soldiering, they are endowed with a constitution which inures them to hardship; they share
with

with their Senegalese brothers an inexhaustible fund of good humour.

I cannot overlook the good work that has been performed by the West African carrier; patient and amenable, he has borne his full share in our arduous task.

As regards my Staff, I am desirous of bringing to special notice the names of Major (temp. Lieut.-Colonel). J. Brough, C.M.G., and Captain R.H. Rowe, Royal Artillery, M.V.O., Royal Marine Artillery, Lieut.-Colonel Brough has rendered valuable service as a General Staff Officer during the whole of the operations, more especially so since November last, when he assumed duty, as Senior Staff Officer of the expedition, from temp. Lieut.-Colonel A.J. Turner, D.S.O., Royal Artillery, who was obliged to return to England on account of ill-health, after performing much useful work. During these latter months the duties connected with this appointment have been of a more responsible and exacting nature than previously, but they have invariably been performed by Lieut.-Colonel Brough with the greatest credit to himself and to my entire satisfaction. Captain Rowe, in his appointment as Deputy-Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, has had a more onerous task than that which usually falls to a junior officer, even in war. His tact, ability and powers of organisation single him out as one of the most promising officers I have met in West Africa.

Of those officers whose names I bring your Lordship's notice for distinguished and meritorious service I am anxious to give particular prominence to Brevet Lieut.-Colonel J.B. Cockburn, Royal Welch Fusiliers, and Major (temp. Lieut.-Colonel) A.H.W. Haywood, D.S.O., Royal Artillery. Both these officers, in their capacity as battalion or column commanders, have experienced the brunt of the hard fighting which has fallen to the British force. In no case has their judgment or discretion been at fault, and I am greatly indebted to them.

To the services controlled by the Royal Engineers have fallen a very large share in the successful prosecution of the campaign,

and

and my thanks are due to Colonel C. Pery, Royal Engineers, and Major F.L.N. Giles, D.S.O., Royal Engineers: the latter officer, as senior officer, Royal Engineers, for the first nine months of the operations, laid the foundation of that sound organisation which has proved so valuable throughout. Colonel Pery joined the expedition in June, 1915, on appointment as Chief Engineer and director of Works, and the work of the department has been subsequently carried out by him in a most efficient manner. It is perhaps, the highest compliment I can pay these officers and their corps when I say that in the Cameroons, as elsewhere, the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Royal Engineers have nobly upheld their best traditions.

The maintenance of a signal service, which has been in the hands of Major Giles in his capacity as Assistant Director of Army Signals, has, under the conditions in which we have been situated, been fraught with unusual difficulties - almost too numerous to mention - but the rapidity of communication has been kept up with great accuracy, and almost as quickly as under peace conditions. I do not think I exaggerate when I state that I could not have controlled numerous and widely separated columns without such satisfactory and ingenious means of communication as have been instituted here.

To Captain D. Wallbach, as Deputy-Assistant Director of Supply and Transport, and to Lieutenant G.E.H. Higdon, who subsequently succeeded him, and to those who worked under them, I desire to give a special word of praise for the readiness with which they have overcome the many difficulties with which they have been confronted in organising, in a most efficient manner, the supply and transport services of the expedition.

In all operations in West Africa such as I have described the work of the Medical Service is of a peculiarly onerous nature. To Lieutenant Colonel J.C.B. Statham, C.M.G., Royal Army Medical Corps, and those officers and non-commissioned officers of his corps, as well

as to the officers of the West African Medical Staff, the Sisters of the Nursing Service, and all subordinate ranks down to the native stretcher-bearer, I express a deep tribute of gratefulness for their unremitting care of the sick and wounded. Their actions have been stamped with a contempt for life in their endeavour to save that of others.

I have received much valuable assistance in dealing with the problems of administering conquered territory from Mr. W.F. Gowers, of the Nigeria Civil Service, and those officers of the Civil Departments of the Allies who have been associated with him.

I cannot conclude this despatch without placing on record my great obligation to the Governor-General of Nigeria, the Governors of the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia, as well as to Major-General J.F. Daniell, commanding troops West Africa. My demands have been numerous, insistent and unusual, but all have been met without hesitation and in a hearty spirit of co-operation. The West African Colonies have been denuded both in personnel and material and their resources have been considerably strained to fulfil my requirements.

I have the honour to be, Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

gez. C.M. Dobell,

Major-General,

Commanding the Allied Forces.

List of officers and non-commissioned and men mentioned for distinguished and meritorious service.

Adamson, No. 10010 Serjeant J., 3rd Bn. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders,

Allen, Captain J.F.W., The Buffs (East Kent Regiment)

Anderson, Major F., Royal Scots

Atkin, Captain B.G., Manchester Regiment

Ayton, Major H.R., Royal Artillery

Balders, Captain, A.W., Norfolk Regiment (Killed)

Be-

Beattie, Captain A.E., The Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment)
 Booth, Major E.B., DSO., Royal Army Medical Corps Artillery,
 Brough, Major (temp. Lieut.-Colonel) J., CMG., MVO., Royal Marine /
 Butler, Captain J.F.P., V.C., King's Royal Rifle Corps,
 Clough, Captain A.B. Royal Engineers,
 Cockburn, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel J.B., Royal Welsh Fusiliers
 Cotton, Lieut.-Colonel W.L., 5th Light Infantry
 Davies, temp. Captain J.E., Army Service Corps
 Dawes, Captain G., South Staffordshire Regt.
 De Miremont, Captain G.E.R., Royal Welsh Fusiliers
 Dinnen, Captain C.H., The King's (Liverpool Regiment). (Killed)
 Everitt, No. 7560 Serjeant L.J., Lincolnshire Regiment
 Fausset, Capt. H.C., North Staffordshire Regt.
 Field, Capt. C.S., Worcestershire Regt.
 Foster, No. 1321 Company Serjeant-Major R., Army Service Corps
 Gibb, Capt. C., Royal Scots Fusiliers
 Giles, Capt. A. H., Gloucestershire Regt.
 Giles, Major F.L.N., DSO., Royal Engineers
 Gorges, Brevet Colonel E.H., C.B., DSO.
 Haywood, Major (temp. Lieut.-Colonel) A.H.W., DSO., Royal Ar-
 tillery
 Hornby, Capt. C.G. East Lancashire Regt.
 Howell, Major H.G., DSO., Royal Artillery
 Langworthy, Lieutenant H.W., Reserve of Officers
 Leonard, temp. Capt. T.M.R., West African Medical Staff
 Lethbridge, No. 19743 Corporal (temp. Serjeant) P.J.R., Royal
 Engineers
 Linder, No. 39170 Serjeant W., Royal Engineers
 Macclaverty, Major C.F.S., DSO., Royal Artillery
 McCallum, temp. Lieut. D., Special Service
 Migeod, temp. Lieutenant G.E.H.
 Minniken, Capt. H.J., West India Regiment

New-

Newstead, Major (temp. Lieut.-Colonel) G.P. Suffolk Regt. (Killed)
 O'Brien, Capt. H.D.S., Northamptonshire Regt.
 Ogilvie, " A.N., North Staffordshire Regt.
 Packwood, temp. Lieut. G.H., attached Royal Engineers
 Percy, No. 5026 Company Quartermaster-Serjeant, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry
 Pery, Colonel C., C.J.
 Prince, No. 14082 Staff Serjeant G., Royal Army Medical Corps
 Redfern, Major A.F., Army Service Corps
 Rose, Major (temp. Lieut.-Colonel) R.A. de B. DSO., Worcestershire Regt.
 Rowe, Capt. R.H., Royal Artillery
 St. Clair, Capt. W.L., Royal Artillery
 Savile, Major C.R.U., DSO., Royal Fusiliers
 Shearing, No. 6228 Colour-Serjeant M., Hampshire Regt.
 Statham, Lieut.-Colonel J.C.B., CMG. Royal Army Medical Corps
 Stirrup, temp., Lieutenant R. attached Gold Coast Regt., W.A.F.F.
 Thurston, Capt. V.B., Dorsetshire Regt.
 Turnbull, No. 1911 Corporal (Lance-Serjeant) N.J., Royal Army Medical Corps
 Turner, Major (temp. Lieut.-Colonel) A.J., DSO., Royal Artillery
 Truss, No. 5049 Serjeant H., Royal Engineers
 Underwood, Capt. J.P.J., Loyal North Lancashire Regt.
 Vine, Lieut. and Quartermaster H.W.T., Army Service Corps
 Wallbach, Capt. D., Reserve of Officers
 Waller, Capt. R.J.R., Royal Artillery
 Warren, Capt. J.F., Durham Light Infantry
 Webb, Capt. S.N.C., South Wales Borderers
 Weston, Capt. (temp. Major) C.H.B., East Yorkshire Regt.
 Willis, Capt. M.H.S., Suffolk Regt.
 Woods, temp. Serjeant R.C., attached Gold Coast Regt.

N.B.- Of the officers and non-commissioned officers included

in

In this list, 35 were serving with the West African Frontier Force.

Native Troops (Imperial).

Sierra Leone Company, Royal Garrison Artillery

No. 566 Acting Bombardier Santigi

36th Company, Royal Engineers

No. 39 Serjeant James Harding

No. 3981 2nd Corporal Berah

No. 74 Sapper Alimanny Susu.

West India Regiment.

No. 5256 Lance-Serjeant Rhoden

No. 2936 Serjeant P. Taylor

No. 5062 Private O. Jordan

No. 28 Private E. Da Costa.

West African Regiment.

No. 1394 Serjeant Silla

No. 2836 Corporal Musa Kata

No. 2764 Serjeant Ali Timini

No. 2371 Corporal Motti Mandingi

No. 4813 Private Amadu Tulay

No. 2301 Serjeant Blackie.

No. 3003 Private Alpha Kuyah

No. 2991 Private Akabu Turay.

5th Light Infantry (Indian Army).

Subadar Major Wahid Ali Khan.

Jemadar Rahmat Khan

No. 1973 Color Havildar Ajmeri

No. 2182 Color Havildar Gharfur Khan

No. 1915 Sepoy Munsab Khan

No. 2126 Sepoy Faiz Mahomed Khan

No. 2725 Sepoy Kazhan Khan.

Na-

*Native Troops (Colonial).**Nigeria Regiment, West African Frontier Force.**Artillery.*

- No. 106 Bombardier Awdu Kano*
- No. 1 Battery Serjeant-Major Maida Musa*
- No. 8 Corporal Awdu Kano*
- No. 39 Bombardier Ossuman 2*
- No. 58 Acting Bombardier Awdu Keffi*
- No. 28 Gun Carrier Moma Kano 4.*

Infantry.

- No. 6823 Acting Lance-Corporal Mai Kudu Kano*
- No. 5472 Company Serjeant-Major Mai Kuchi*
- No. 5397 Acting Lance-Corporal Jmoru 1.*
- No. 183 Private Dan Hadeija*
- No. 5170 Lance-Corporal Bisallah*
- No. 1591 Serjeant Moma Maidubi*
- No. 5689 Lance-Corporal Musa Kussuri*
- No. 5890 Corporal Maifindi Shua*
- No. 6433 Serjeant Amadu Kano*
- No. 6430 Private Amadu Kanna*
- No. R/389 Lance Corporal Garuba Duguri*
- No. 6454 Private Ossuman Gombe*
- No. 6410 Serjeant Mamadu Kukawa*
- No. 5700 Lance-Corporal Mama Gwiba*
- No. 5542 Serjeant Mama Dikwoa*
- No. 5751 Private Musa Godibawa*
- No. 128 Machine-gun Carrier Masu Bauchi*
- No. 2 Machine-gun Carrier Ari Kukawa*
- No. R/388 Lance-Corporal Mama Bawa*
- No. 6301 Private Momadu Sokoto*
- No. 1397 Private Buba Maimadi*
- No. 5395 Company Serjeant-Major Morakinjo Jbadan.*

No.

No. 1616 Serjeant Braima Sare
 No. 2303 Corporal Abo
 No. 116 Serjeant Garuba Bauchi
 No. 3165 Lance-Corporal Jsa Bida
 No. 3268 Corporal Amadu Lakoja
 No. 3523 Lance-Corporal Jge Offa.
 No. 2897 Company Serjeant-Major Belo Akure.
 No. 2533 Corporal Alao Jbadan
 No. 571 Serjeant Mama Kemberi
 No. 5394 Private Mama Bauchi
 No. 3780 Lance-Corporal Awudu Katsena
 No. 4257 Private Toyibo Jlla
 No. 2393 Corporal Durowotu Jbadan
 No. 4245 Serjeant Mamadu Bachi
 No. 2833 Serjeant Adisah
 No. 5277 Private Azurka Miradi
 No. 3289 Private Ojo Offa.

Gold Coast Regiment, West African Frontier Force.

Artillery.

No. 4388 Serjeant Bukari Moshi
 No. 3 Headman Mozongawa

Infantry

No. 4705 Lance-Corporal Jekeda Jure
 No. 3926 Company Serjeant-Major Manassara Kaiyarga
 No. 4961 Serjeant Bukari
 No. 6414 Corporal Palpuke Grumah
 No. 2845 Serjeant Setku Fulani
 No. 4087 Serjeant Amadu Fulani 5.
 No. 1897 Serjeant Bakano Grunshi
 No. 5093 Corporal Jssa Grunshi
 No. 5385 Private Jssa Grunshi
 No. 5658 Private Sulley Jbadan

No.

No. 7234 Private Jatto Dagarti.
 No. 4865 Corporal Moma Wangara.
 No. 4602 Serjeant Awadu Bakano.
 No. 4016 Serjeant Amadu Tumutu.
 No. 4690 Corporal Jmoru Bazaberimi.
 No. 6756 Corporal Timbila Busanga.

Sierra Leone Battalion, West African Frontier Force.

No. 2999 Lance-Corporal Sorie Karnu.
 No. 2900 Private Samba Katter.
 No. 3194 Private Santiggi Karnu.
 No. 3367 Private Monde Gerala.

Gambia Company, West African Frontier Force.

No. 511 Private Saljen Sidibi.
 No. 202 Serjeant Samba Bah.
 No. 147 Company Serjeant-Major Ebrima Jalu.

Colonial Office,

31st May, 1916.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies has received from the Governor-General of Nigeria the following report covering a despatch from Brigade-General Cunliffe, CMG., on the military operations in the Northern Cameroons:-

Government House, Nigeria,

23rd March, 1916.

Sir,- In accordance with your instructions I have the honour to transmit a consecutive account by Brigadier-General Cunliffe, CMG., of the operations of the Nigerian and Allied Forces on the east frontiers of Nigeria and in the northern part of the Cameroons, from the outbreak of hostilities in August, 1914, to their completion, by the conquest of the Cameroons, in February, 1916.

2. Early in 1915 I learnt from Major-General Dobell that the heavy task in which he was engaged in the south precluded (as in-

deed

deed was manifest) the possibility of controlling the operations on the Nigerian frontier and in the north, with which he had no means of communication. J accordingly directed Colonel Cunliffe, Commandant of the Nigeria Regiment, to take command of these operations.

3. J have already report to you -but it is appropriate that J should repeat it here my appreciation of the way in which this campaign has been conducted by Brigadier-General Cunliffe. He truly says in his report that the efficiency -and J may almost add the gallantry - of the rank and file of our native troops is measured by the personnel of their leaders. They are capable, as they have proved, of undergoing privations and of performing feats of gallantry which will compare with those of any of the troops of His Majesty's Oversea Dominions, if led by officers whom they know and in whom they have confidence.

In the operations here recorded there were many such officers, but there was none who evoked the highest enthusiasm and confidence alike of British officers and native troops in the same degree as General Cunliffe himself, and it is in my judgment due to his own personality -aided by the sound judgment of his Staff Officer, Colonel Wright, V.C. - that the unbroken success of these operations is alone to be attributed.

4. There would be no need for me to invite the attention of any expert reader of this report to the extraordinary precision with which in a series of operations a number of columns converged on their objective, and the strategical skill with which position after position was rendered untenable to the enemy without heavy sacrifice by our troops, were it not that the report hardly gives an adequate impression of the difficulties of the country traversed. General Cunliffe advanced over 600 miles of mountainous country, intersected by deep ravines and tropical rivers swollen by the hardly finished rainy season. At Banyo and elsewhere were positions of almost impregnable natural strength, reinforced by German military science - his

line

line of communication finally extended over a distance of 400 miles.

5. In spite of my desire to be terse I cannot refrain from adding that, so far as I can ascertain, the high traditions of the Force were maintained in relation to the native populations. Among the large number of troops and carriers looting and ill-treatment of the people was unknown.

6. General Cunliffe has submitted a list of officers and men whose conduct merits special recognition and reward, and I trust that his recommendations will be liberally considered. I have at the same time to bring his own services under your consideration and that of the Army Council, and to point out that he personally led his troops in the field throughout this difficult campaign.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) F.D. Lugard

Governor-General.

The Right Honourable A. Bonar Law, M.P., P.C.,

Secretary of State for the Colonies, etc., etc., etc.

Headquarters Nigeria Regiment,
Lagos, 16th March, 1916.

Your Excellency, -

With the occupation of Jaunde on the 1st January, 1916, by the troops under the command of Major-General C.M. Dobell, CMG., DSO., the task assigned to the Allied Forces in the Northern Cameroons, which it has been my privilege to command since the 5th February, 1915, was practically completed.

That task was, briefly, to clear the enemy from that portion of the German Cameroons which lies between Lake Chad to the north and the Nachtigal Rapids on the Sanaga River to the south, while the Allied Force under Major-General Dobell and the French forces under General Aymerich were converging on Jaunde from the west and east respectively-

Then

When Jaunde fell to General Dobell the only point north of the Sanaga River which still remained in German hands was the mountain of Mora, and the garrison of that place surrendered on the 18th February.

2. I have now the honour to report as follows upon the operations of the various forces under my command:-

As Your Excellency is aware, I was not, on the outbreak of war in August, 1914, commanding the troops in Nigeria, but it will be necessary, in order to make this report clear, to commence with a short summary of the military events which had taken place on the Nigeria-Camerouns frontier between the date of the declaration of war and that on which I assumed control of the operations on or near the frontier.

3. On the outbreak of war, then, three columns drawn from the Nigeria Regiment were concentrated near the German frontier.

- (i) The Maidugari Column at the place of that name, under the command of Captain (now Major) R.W. Fox, Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
- (ii) The Yola Column at the place of that name, under the command of the late Lieutenant-Colonel P. Maclear, Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
- (iii) The Cross River Column at Ikom, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel G.T. Mair, DSO., RA.

4. Soon afterwards it became known that His Majesty's Government had, in conjunction with the French Government, decided to send an Allied Overseas expedition against Duala, and three battalions of Infantry (consisting of four companies each) and two batteries of Artillery (eight 2.95 " guns), together with appropriate medical personnel drawn from the West African Medical Staff, and Marine, Engineer, Telegraph, Railway, Supply and Transport Sections drawn from the various civil departments in Nigeria, were held in readiness to embark at various Nigerian ports.

ports to take part in this expedition.

5. The rôle of the three frontier columns was henceforth to be confined to one of local activity, with the object of gaining information of the enemy's movements, and distracting his attention from our main objective - Duala.

6. The undertakings of these frontier columns were attended by misfortune at the outset. The Maidugari Column, having crossed the frontier on 25th August, encountered an enemy force in an almost impregnable position in the mountains near Hora whence it was unable to dislodge them. After suffering some casualties, this column took up a position to the south of Hora with the object of preventing the enemy there from joining hands with the German garrison at Garua.

Here the British column was joined on the 13th October, 1914, by a French force, based on Fort Lamy and under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Brisset, who had succeeded at the second attempt in capturing Kusséri on 25th September, 1914.

7. The Yola column crossed by the frontier on 25th August. The mounted infantry, after a sharp fight, drove a party of the enemy from the village of Tepe. Our losses were, however, heavy.

The column continued its march on Garua, which place was attacked on the night of 30/31st August. The attack failed and, after suffering heavy losses, the whole force was compelled to fall back on Yola.

8. The advanced troops of the Cross River Column holding Nsanakang were, on the 6th September, suddenly attacked by a largely superior German force brought hurriedly from Duala, and, in spite of a most gallant resistance, were practically annihilated, only two officers and some ninety native rank and file escaped by forcing their way through the enemy at the point of the bayonet.

The German losses in personnel were even heavier than our own.

9. The immediate effect of the reverses suffered by the Yola and Cross River Columns was to reduce by one battalion of infantry and four guns the number of Nigerian troops to be put at the disposal of Major-General Dobell for the expedition against Duala.

10. The Yola and Cross River Columns were reorganised, the defences of Yola were strengthened, and the troops there placed temporarily under the command of Lieut.-Colonel W.I. Jebb-Bowen, Middlesex Regiment, but the frontier columns had to confine themselves for the time being to the task of containing before them the largest possible force of Germans in order to facilitate the operations under Major-General Dobell (who had, on 28th September, 1914, established himself at Duala and Bonaberi), as well as the advance into the Cameroons of the French columns under General Aymerich, based on the French Congo.

11. The last quarter of 1914, therefore, found the various frontier columns engaged in an active defence of our own territory. On several occasions enemy raids penetrated into the Muri Province, but none of these achieved any appreciable success.

On such attempt on the part of the enemy is worthy of mention here.

On the 17th September, 1914, two British officers (Lieut.-B.E. Waters, R.N., and Major A.E. Churcher) with 57 Police were attacked at Takum by one German company with three Europeans and a machine gun. The fight continued from 11.30 a.m. till 5.30 p.m., when the enemy were finally repulsed and forced to beat a rapid retreat.

12. By 29th January, 1915, the general situation was as follows:-

The Allied force under Major-General Dobell was holding the whole of the Northern Railway as well as the Midland Railway as far

far as Edea.

The French columns under General Aymerich had made some progress in their advance into the German Colony from the east and south east.

In the north Mora still held out.

A French force under Lieutenant-Colonel Brisset has joined Lieut.-Colonel Webb-Bowen's column, and was watching Garua from the east.

The original Cross River Column, which had been reinforced after Nsanakang, was holding Ossidinge, to which place Lieutenant Colonel Hair had been withdrawn after he had advanced, between 25th December, 1914, and 8th January, 1915, in the face of very considerable opposition as far as Tinto. A smaller column under Major G.D. Mann, R.A., based on Jol, was watching the frontier from Takum to Karkabi in the Muri Province.

13. On this date J went to Duala to confer with Major-General Dobell. There it was decided that the time had arrived when ^{it} would be of assistance to the general Allied plan if energetic action was taken in the Northern Cameroons.

14. On the 5th February J returned to Lagos, and in accordance with your instructions J left for Yola on the 15th, attended by Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) W.D. Wright, V.C., as my Chief of Staff, to take command of all the Allied Forces in the Northern Cameroons, and to direct the operations of the Cross River and Jol columns.

15. My first objective was to take Garua and prevent the German forces uniting with those further south on the Ngaundere Plateau, after which J hoped to move southward and co-operate with the forces under the command of Major-General Dobell and General Aymerich.

16. My information with regard to Garua was that the place was very strongly fortified, and that the German Artillery there could

could outrange any guns which either Lieutenant-Colonel Brisset or Lieutenant-Colonel Webb-Bowen possessed at the time. Before leaving Duala, therefore, J had made arrangements by which one of H.M.S. "Challenger's" 12 pr. guns, with 500 pounds of ammunition, should be placed at my disposal, while the French authorities had similarly directed that a 95 mm. gun should be sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Brisset.

17. The naval gun left Duala on the 2nd February under the command of Lieutenant-Commander L.H.K. Hamilton, R.N., and reached Yola on the 12th March. As the last part of the journey up the River Benue, owing to the dry season, had to be made in canoes, its progress was necessarily somewhat slow.

18. J reached Yola on the 15th March, 1915, and there met and discussed the situation with Lieutenant-Colonel Webb-Bowen and Capitaine Ferrandi, Staff Officer to Lieutenant-Colonel Brisset.

19. It was abundantly clear that it would be necessary to concentrate the largest possible British force for the attack on Garua, and also to assemble the French forces which were at this time somewhat scattered. J therefore withdrew three companies from the Cross River column and one company from the Jbi column, and ordered them to Yola.

This move left the forces on the Eastern frontier somewhat depleted, and J recognised that there was a certain amount of risk of enemy raids on British territory and on my line of communications, the Benue River; that risk had, however, to be faced.

20. From the 12th April to 26th April telegraphic communication between Yola and Lagos was interrupted as the result of an enemy raid which penetrated as far as Mutum Biu, a town close to the Benue, where the Residency was destroyed.

21. On the 18th April J reached the British camp at Bogole,
near

near Garua, and commenced to extend the investing force to close in the enemy from the south and south-west. The strength of the British and French troops at that time was:-

British.

8 companies infantry,
1 company mounted infantry,
3 guns (including the naval gun),
9 machine guns.

French.

3 companies infantry,
1 squadron cavalry,
2 guns,
2 mitrailleuses.

22. On the night of the 21/22 April a German force, said to consist of about nine Europeans and 100 mounted men and 170 infantry, under the command of Hauptmann von Crailsheim, broke out of Garua to the south, passing to the westward of our most westerly detachment. This force was joined about half way between Turua and Ngaundere by some four Europeans and 50 native soldier from the latter place, and J had every reason to suppose that it was von Crailsheim's intention to escort this reinforcement back to Garua.

The next information received of the party was, however, that it was attacking our small post at Gurin. The attack failed, owing to a most gallant defence, during which the Officer Commanding Gurin was unfortunately killed and the enemy, by avoiding all roads and making a wonderful march of 28 hours without a halt, succeeded in avoiding the troops J had sent to intercept him, and made his way safely back to Garua.

23. After several reconnaissances J had by this time decided that the line of attack which offered the greatest prospect of success was from the north, and by the 25th May J

had

had concentrated the bulk of the British force secretly at Jamboutu Manga. This concentration took time, owing to the large amount of material and stores to be moved by man transport, but it remained unknown to the enemy until 26th May.

24. From the 26th May onwards our outposts were for several days subjected to shell fire from the German guns, but soon after the arrival of the French heavy gun (95 mm) on 28th May the superiority of our artillery began to be apparent.

The heavy French gun was transported from Lagos to Yola by the Nigeria Marine, a performance of which that Department may well be proud, for the river had fallen considerably.

25. The night of the 30/31st May found the bulk of the Allied force entrenched 3,000 - 3,500 yards from the German Fort A.

26. From 31st May to 10th June we pushed forward our advance, entrenching under cover of darkness until on the 10th June we had established a line of trenches with a frontage of about 400 yards within 1,000 yards of Fort A, with an efficient service of communication trenches to the rear.

The question of water supply was one of considerable difficulty, water having to be carried to the trenches in pots over a distance of two miles.

27. On the night of the 9/10th June the enemy made an attempt to break out to the south, but were met by the fire of a British infantry company at Bilonde, and driven back. A second attempt was made between the infantry company and the mounted infantry company, but the Benue was now in flood, and, although some 45 native rank and file succeeded, by discarding their arms and uniform, in making their escape, a far larger number were drowned - we recovered 70 bodies from the river - and the remainder returned to Garua.

28. At 3.30 p.m. on the 10th June, the enemy native troops having by this time got quite out of hand, the white flag was hoisted

hoisted in all the forts, and Hauptmann von Crailsheim offered to surrender on terms. These were refused, and he was informed that failing an unconditional surrender within two hours, hostilities would recommence automatically.

29. Garua surrendered unconditionally at 6 p.m. the same day. Garua and its surroundings -naturally strong- had by artificial means been turned into an entrenched camp, which would have done credit to the engineers of an European battlefield.

The Commander, Hauptmann von Crailsheim, acknowledged after the fall that he had employed 2,000 labourers for five months on the construction of the defences.

The amount of personnel and material consisted of:-

37 Europeans

212 native ranks

5 guns with 858 shell

10 maxims

229 rifles

114,920 rounds small arm ammunition.

In addition also a large quantity of stores of all kinds -tools, medical equipment, etc.

30. Immediately after the fall of Garua it was considered imperative to follow up our success, keep all fugitives on the run, and, most important of all, to seize the northern edge of the Ngaundere plateau without delay, thus anticipating any enemy concentration there and securing a line from which J might later advance to the assistance of the Allied Forces in the Southern Cameroons. With this object in view J directed a force under Lieut.-Colonel Webb-Bowen from Garua on Ngaundere, giving Lieut.-Colonel Brisset, who remained at Garua, instructions to reinforce him with the bulk of the garrison of that place, should he appear to be in difficulties.

31. On the 15th June, in order that J might be in direct te-

legraphic communication with Your Excellency and also with Major-General Dobell at Duala, J moved my headquarters to Yola.

On reaching Yola J further despatched a small force under Captain C.E. Roberts, Northamptonshire Regiment, to Kotscha, Maio Kaleh, and Tschamba.

32. On the 27th June Kotscha and Maio Kaleh were occupied, after slight opposition the enemy retiring towards Banyo with our mounted infantry in pursuit. There were no casualties on our side.

33. On the 28th June the German outposts holding the steep paths leading up to the edge of the Ngaundere plateau were, in the midst of a terrific tornado, completely surprised and defeated by the advanced guard troops of Lieut.-Colonel Webb-Bowen's column, under the command of Captain C.H. Fowle, Hampshire Regiment and Ngaundere itself was occupied the same evening. During the night the enemy garrison returned and attacked the station. This counter-attack -with a loss to us of one native non-commissioned officer and five native soldiers wounded, was driven off and the Germans retired on Tibati.

Soon afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel Brisset, with a force from Garua, arrived at Ngaundere. Lieut.-Colonel Brisset then pushed reconnaissances towards Kunde and Tibati.

34. At this time J learnt that Major-General Dobell's operations in the south had temporarily been brought to a stand still owing to the rains.

J therefore considered that it would be unwise for the present to push on towards Banyo, for, though J recognised the importance of this point, J doubted whether, in the face of a cessation of all active offensive operations in the south by Major-General Dobell, J could be in a position to maintain myself there with the force at my disposal.

35. J therefore decided to content myself for the time being with the occupation of the line Ngaundere-Kotscha-Gashaka.

J accordingly strengthened the Jbi column, placed the troops on the eastern front, except the Cross River column, under the command of Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) G.D. Mann, R.A.; and directed him to occupy Gashaka and establish a strong line of communications to his rear with Jbi, on the Benue.

36. In the meantime, as the rains in the north to not hinder operations to the extent which they do in the south, J determined myself to attempt the reduction of Mora, since, if J could effect this, J should release the investing force to take part in the offensive movement southwards when the time arrived for it to commence.

J understood that J had from August to November in which to accomplish this task.

37. On the 9th August J left Yola and on the 23rd August J arrived at Sava, four miles from Mora mountain, which in the following days J proceeded to reconnoitre.

38. Mora mountain has a base perimeter of about thirty miles, it rises precipitously to a height of 1,700 feet, and its sides, which are so steep as to be accessible only in a few places to men using both hands and feet, are covered with huge boulders, affording excellent cover to the defenders.

39. J eventually decided that my best chance of success lay in launching an attack from a hill called Ouatchke already in our possession, the summit of which is nearly level with, but separated by a deep valley 600 yards wide, from the northern end of Mora mountain, which end goes by the name of Dabascoum.

40. From Ouatchke J made three separate attacks on Dabascoum. The third attack at length succeeded in gaining a footing on the summit, but found further progress barred by a redoubt. A portion of the 1st Nigeria Regiment attempted to carry this work with the bayonet, but was stopped by fire within 60 yards of the enemy defences. Our men held on to the position they had gained

for

for forty-eight hours without food or water, and after every effort to supply them/^{had} failed J was compelled to order a withdrawal. Our casualties included Captain R.N. Pike, Nigeria Political Service, killed, a most gallant officer and fearless leader, who had already distinguished himself on several occasions.

41. J now realised that to take Mora two things were indispensable - more artillery ammunition and more time.

Time was unfortunately not at my disposal. On 15th September J learnt by telegram that as a result of a conference which had been held in Duala, and attended by Major-General Dobell, General Aymerich, and M. Merlin (Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa), it had been decided to resume the offensive in the south early in October instead of in November, which J had hitherto believed to be the time appointed.

42. Thus it was J was forced to abandon the Mora enterprise and, leaving behind troops equal in numbers to be the original investing force, J marched on 17th September with the remainder to Yola, arriving on 26th September.

43. In the meanwhile several minor events had occurred on the Ngaundere-Kontscha-Gashaka line. Captain C.H. Fowle with one company from Ngaundere had occupied Tingere on 23rd July, and had there been counter-attacked by an enemy force of some four Europeans and 150 natives from Tibati. The German attack broke down, and was turned to a rout by one of our native non-commissioned officers leading his section from their trenches in a bayonet charge.

44. Gashaka was occupied on 13th August as a result of the excellent handling of his company by Captain C.G. Bowyer-Smith, Gloucestershire Regiment, who, after a turning movement lasting 12 hours through most difficult mountainous country intersected by many rivers, succeeded in occupying a hill two miles east of Gashaka.

The enemy fled in all directions, leaving all his property
in

in our hands.

45. It was now my intention to advance to and occupy the line Tibati-Banyo-Bamenda, and with this end in view I issued orders to set the following forces in motion:-

(i) The French column (Lieutenant-Colonel Brisset), to move from Ngaundere on Tibati on 15th October.

(ii) Lieut.-Colonel Webb-Bowen's column, from Tingere on Galim on 15th October.

(iii) On company from Takwa on Kentu on 12th October.

(iv.) The Cross River column (Major) Crookenden, East Kent Regiment,) from Ossidinge (leaving a sufficient force to hold that place,) via Widekum on Bamenda on 12th October.

I asked Major-General Dobell if he could assist this latter move by sending a force from Bare to Dschang on 12th October.

(v) My own advance from Kotscha was timed for 14th October, and Major Mann was ordered to move from Gashaka in time to be in position at Gandua when my main column was at Mba, from which two places the combined advance on Banyo was to take place. While, to protect my left flank and cut off any of the enemy who might be retiring from Galim towards Banyo, the mounted infantry were to move by a route east of the Genderu Pass.

46. On the night of the 22nd/23rd October Major Mann was at Gandua, and my main column at Mba, with the mounted infantry (Major H.A. Porter, DSO. Liverpool Regiment, Reserve of Officers) at Mbamti.

The latter were now ordered to move on and cut the Banyo-Tibati road, and leaving a post on it, to get astride of the Banyo-Fumban road. This was done; on 23rd October the advances from Gandua and Mba on Banyo began. At 10 p.m. on the night of the 23rd October I got into signalling communication with Major Mann, and on the morn-

ing

ing of the 24th October he occupied the European settlement of Banyo, one hour ahead of my advanced guard. The country was difficult, being mountainous, intersected by rivers, and covered with elephant grass. Both columns were opposed, but our converging advance continually threatened the enemy communications and prevented his making any prolonged stand.

47. The effect of the other moves referred to in para. 45 above was that Tibati, after slight opposition, was occupied by Lieut.-Colonel Brisset, whose advance on that place had been facilitated by a movement of Lieutenant-Colonel Webb-Bowen's column from Galim to Tibati, both columns practically entering Tibati together on the 3rd November.

Kentu was occupied by a company from Takum on 17th October.

Bamenda was occupied by Major Crookenden after a brisk fight on 22nd October.

Dschang was occupied by Lieut.-Colonel W.L. Cotton, 5th Light Infantry, Indian Army, from Bare on the 6th November.

48. My line then ran through Tibati-Banyo-Bamenda-Dschang, but the occupation of Banyo town had brought no decisive result since the enemy had prepared another defensive position, similar to that at Mora, in the mountains close by.

It was impossible to advance further until this position was in our hands.

49. Banyo mountain is a single feature rising 1,200 feet above the surrounding country, which is much broken by small hills. The slopes of the mountain are very steep and covered with large boulders which had been linked together by some 300 sangars. Every prominent commanding point had been constructed, brick houses with glazed windows had been erected to accommodate the Europeans, and some 40 tons of grain, 226 head of cattle, hundreds of fowls and a vast quantity of agricultural implements and other material had been accumulated. A short Banyo mountain was the rallying point for the

gar-

garrisons of Banyo, Dschang and Bamenda.

Every preparation had been made to enable the Germans to withstand a prolonged siege.

From captured correspondence, intercepted letters, statements of Europeans and native prisoners, an absolute confidence reigned throughout the German forces in the Cameroons that the garrison would hold out till the end of the war.

50. By the 2nd November J had established five companies of infantry on the underfeatures and disposed the mounted infantry on a wide circle below to give notice of any enemy attempt to break out. The attack was to be supported by three 2,95 " guns to the north, north-west and south respectively.

51. Our attack was timed to commence at daybreak on 4th November, and until 9 a.m. that morning the mountain was shrouded in thick fog, which enabled our troops to make considerable progress, though it prevented the different units from mutually assisting each other or benefiting during their advance by covering fire from the guns.

Under cover of the fog Captain Bowyer-Smijth succeeded in leading his company right up to the summit. Here, however, they came under a cross-fire from several directions, and Captain Bowyer-Smijth, one of our most able and flashing Company Commanders, having been killed, the Company was forced back to the foot of the mountain.

52. Noon on the 4th November found the remaining companies about half way up the slope, holding on stubbornly within thirty yards on an entrenched position, and unable to progress further in daylight.

During the night of the 4/5th November the enemy expended a large number of dynamite bombs, a new, and to our native troops, trying weapon. During that night, however, and throughout the following day our men fought their way upwards turning sangar after sangar, until by dusk on the 5th November they were within about 100 yards of the top.

The task of supplying the troops with food and water was one

of

of no little difficulty and danger, and great credit is due to the transport carriers who performed this service.

At 7 p.m. on the 5th November a violent thunderstorm broke, and at daybreak on 6th November the summit was carried.

53. It was found that under cover of the storm the enemy had broken up into small parties and crept down the mountain, the majority only to be captured later by our posts on the road below.

54. This action may, I think, be justly described as one of the most arduous ever fought by native African troops.

55. My next objectives were -

(i) An advance to the line Yoko-Ngambe-Ditam.

(ii) thence to move on the Nachtigal Rapids, on the Sannaga, River, a point which is only about forty miles north of Jaunde, on which Major-General Dobell and General Aymerich were converging from the west and east respectively.

55. With these ends in view the troops at Kentu were ordered to join Major Crookenden at Bamenda. Major Crookenden was ordered to move with a strong force as possible on Fumban.

Another column (Major G.L. Unlucke, Royal Lancaster Regiment, Special Reserve, Reserve of Officers,) was directed from Banyo on Fumban via Gorori, while Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton co-operated from Dschang on Fumban.

56. Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton and Major Crookenden joined hands at Bagam; they were opposed at the crossing of the Nun River, but a turning movement made by Major Crookenden, and the threat to the enemy's communications from Major Unlucke's column, drove the enemy from their position, and Fumban was occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel Cotton and Major Unlucke on the 2nd December.

The enemy retired to the south-east pursued by Major Crookenden, but through receiving false information he was led fifty miles astray and touch was lost.

57. The eastern column (Lieutenant-Colonel Brisset) entered Yoko on the 1st December with only slight opposition, while my centre column, after meeting with steady resistance all the way from Gorori, occupied Ngambe on the 4th December, the enemy crossing the Kim River, destroying the bridge and canoes, and entrenching himself on the far bank.

On the 11th December J arrived at Ngambe with the reserve column, and on the same day, fresh canoes having been procured, the German position on the south bank of the Kim was turned.

58. J then ordered the following moves:

Lieutenant-Colonel Webb-Bowen's column on Linte, 13th December.

Major C.C. West, Royal Highlanders, with a detachment gun on Ditam.

As a result Linte and Ditam were occupied simultaneously after slight opposition on the 18th December.

59. From the line Yoko-Linte-Ditam J ordered an advance to the line Ngila-Nedenge, and by the 1st January J had concentrated the whole of my striking force on this latter line.

60. On the 4th January J ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Brisset to seize the crossing of the Sanaga at the Nachtigal rapids, and placed Lieutenant-Colonel Webb-Bowen's column at his disposal to assist him in the operation.

61. On the 8th January J learnt that Major-General Dobell's troops had, on the 1st January, occupied Jaunde. J had at this time been for several days in communication with General Aymerich through Lieut.-Colonel Brisset. My advanced troops were on the Sanaga, about 40 miles from Jaunde, having marched and fought continuously over 600 miles since the 18th September.

62. My line of communications with Jbi was, however, 400 miles long, and strained to the utmost, and it was obvious that my force must either soon come to a standstill to await further supplies or that J must open a new line of supply through Jaunde and Duala.

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The latter alternative J deemed to be impracticable owing to the congestion which must inevitably exist in the Jaunde district, into which General Aymerich's troops were pouring from the east.

J therefore decided on a partial withdrawal along my lines of communication, and removed my Headquarters to Fumban, there to await developments. My orders were, however, too late to prevent Lieutenant-Colonel Webb-Bowen and his command from entering Jaunde on the heels of General Aymerich and Lieutenant-Colonel Brisst.

Lieut.-Colonel Webb-Bowen and the British troops under his command were then evacuated by Major-General Dobell via Duala and sent back to Nigeria by sea, while Lieut.-Colonel Brisst and the French troops under his command came henceforth under the direct control of General Aymerich.

63. J returned to Fumban on 21st January, and while there learnt that Your Excellency desired to see me in Lagos, and as Major-General Dobell had also expressed a wish to meet me, J left Fumban for Lagos via Duala on 23rd January.

J arrived at Duala on the 5th February and at Lagos on the 9th February, having left garrisons at Fumban, Bamenda, Banyo and Kentscha, and ordered certain units back to Nigeria overland.

64. There now remained only the one spot in the whole of the Cameroons still occupied by an enemy garrison, namely, Mora.

It was considered imperative to capture this place as soon as possible.

Before, however, proceeding to do this, it was deemed advisable to send something in the shape of an ultimatum to Hauptmann von Raben, the Commander, offering generous terms in case of surrender.

These terms were:

(i) Officers to be allowed to retain their swords.

(ii) Native ranks to be released given safe passages to their homes.

(iii) All Europeans to be sent to England as prisoners of war.

On the receipt of this message Hauptmann von Raben accepted

the

the terms offered, and on the 18th February capitulated with his whole force.

65. The general health of the troops throughout the campaign in the Northern Cameroons has been excellent. This result is due to the untiring devotion, energy and skill of the medical officers attached to the different columns.

In this connection I would particularly wish to mention the services of my medical officers.

66. I have pleasure in here recording my appreciation of the services rendered by our French Allies, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Brisset, upon whom, to the great satisfaction of myself and my officers, His Majesty was pleased to confer the dignity of the Companionship of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George. The Eastern Column was under his command until it reached Yoko, after which the French troops were absorbed in General Aymenrich's command.

67. I wish to express my grateful appreciation of the services rendered by the civil officials and non-officials of Nigeria placed at my disposal by Your Excellency to take part in these operations.

Several of these have lost their lives, gallantly fighting in the field; others still have the satisfaction of remembering that in a time of emergency they cheerfully and loyally came forward and offered their services. They have assisted in upholding the honour of their country in a theatre of war removed from more striking events, a circumstance which redounds to their greater honour and credit.

I wish also to express my indebtedness to all Departments of the Nigeria Civil Service for their assistance and to those residents of Provinces whose proximity to the frontier brought them more closely into contact with the troops in the field, and who always rendered my every assistance in their power, though their civil work was

great-

greatly increased thereby.

68. This report would be incomplete were I to conclude it without a word of praise to the native rank and file of the Nigeria Regiment, who have borne the brunt of the fighting; as well as to those natives, the transport carriers, who have toiled incessantly under heavy loads and at times also under heavy fire to keep the troops in the field supplied with food and munitions.

The Nigeria Regiment is composed of men of many different tribes their characteristics, traditions, and even their languages differ as widely as does the food to which they are accustomed.

They have been called upon to take part in a great struggle, the rights and wrongs of which they can scarcely have been expected dimly to perceive.

They have been through the, to them, entirely novel experience of facing an enemy armed with modern weapons and led by highly-trained officers.

Their rations have been scanty, their bare-foot marches long and trying, and their fights at times extremely arduous, yet they have not been found wanting either in discipline, devotion to their officers, or personal courage, as the list of recommendations which I am proud to enclose, amply testifies.

69. In the various reports which I have from time to time made during the course of the operations summarised above, I have brought to Your Excellency's notice the names of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men who have distinguished themselves either by individual acts of gallantry or by the exceptional zeal and ability with which they have carried out their duties.

As this report is intended to cover the whole of the operations in the Northern Cameroons from start to finish, I take this opportunity of recapitulating all such names, and append a list (Appendix A) containing the names of all those whose services I consider deserve recognition.

70. I have found it difficult in a comparatively brief report of this nature covering as it does a period of over eighteen months' hostilities, in which some 3,000 to 4,000 Allied French and British troops have been engaged, to give a very definite idea of the arduous nature of the work which has been done.

I have, etc.

(Signed) F.J. Cunliffe,

Brigadier-General,

Commanding Allied Forces, Northern
Cameroons.

Appendix A.

List of Officers and Non-commissioned Officers and men mentioned for distinguished and meritorious service.

West African Frontier Force. (Nigeria Regiment).

Adams, Major G.S.C., The Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment)

Ambrose, Captain W.G., Cheshire Regiment, Reserve of Officers, Nigeria Political Service

Bailey, Doctor J.C.M., West African Medical Staff

Bowker-Booker, Mr. H.T., Nigeria Posts and Telegraphs

Bowyer-Smijth, Captain C.G., Gloucestershire Regiment (killed)

Brackenbury, Capt. E.A., East Kent Regt., Reserve of Officers

Burr, Quartermaster-Serjeant W.E., Scottish Rifles

Churcher, Major A.E., Lancashire Fusiliers, Special Reserve, Reserve of Officers,

Clark, Doctor W.S., West African Medical Staff

Collins, Civil Armourer A.T.

Collins, Captain J.G., Worcestershire Regt.

Crookenden, Major J., East Kent Regt.

Cummins, Capt. A.A., Royal Artillery, Nigeria Political Service

Digby, Doctor W.E.S., West African Medical Staff

Fitz-

Fitzpatrick, Second Lieutenant J.F.T., Essex Regt., Reserve of Officers

Foulkes, Capt. H.D., Royal Artillery, Reserve of Officers, Nigeria Political Service

Fowle, Capt. C.H., Hampshire Regt.

Fox, Major R.W., Royal Warwickshire Regt.

Gibbs, Capt. (Temporary Major) J.T., 3rd Dragoon Guards

Griffiths, Serjeant T.A., 11th (Service) Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusiliers

Handley, Temporary Lieutenant G.F.B., Nigeria Political Service

Harvey, Serjeant R.E., Royal Army Medical Corps and West African Medical Staff

Heathcote, Capt. G.N., Royal Engineers, Special Reserve, Nigeria Political Service

Loch, Capt. E.E., Highland Light Infantry

Macdonald, Temporary Serjeant A., Nigeria Railway, late Scots Guards

Macdonell, Capt. D.H., DSO., Highland Light Infantry

Mann, Lieut.-Colonel G.D., DSO., Royal Artillery

Mannion, Colour-Serjeant J., Manchester Regiment

Mytton, Temporary Lieutenant A.R., Nigeria Political Service

Peacock, Doctor W.H., West African Medical Staff

Pike, Temporary Capt. R.N.

Pring, Capt. F.J.H.

Reith, Serjeant J., Royal Highlanders

Robinson, Capt. A.C., South Lancashire Regt.

Rowe Temporary Captain C.F., Nigeria Political Service

Salter, Captain E.L., Northumberland Fusiliers

Secombe, Captain G., Royal West Kent Regt. Special Reserve, Reserve of Officers Nigeria Political Service

Simpson, Staff Quartermaster and Honorary Capt. J.M.

Spender, Serjeant J.F. 12th Lancers

Steed, Second Lieut. R., Royal Fusiliers

Suf-

Suffern, Doctor T.H., West African Medical Staff
 Taylor, Lieut.R.R., King's Own Scottish Borders
 Turner, Colour-Serjeant I.C., Royal Scots
 Unlacke Major G.L., Royal Lancaster Regt.
 Waters, Lieut. B.E.M., R.N., Nigeria Political Service
 Watson, Doctor C.E.S., West African Medical Staff
 Webb-Bowen, Lieut.-Colonel W.J., Middlessex Regt.
 Wightwick, Temporary Lieut. C., Nigeria Political Service
 Williams, Doctor R.F., West African Medical Staff
 Williams, Mr., Posts and Telegraphs (Native Staff)
 Wright, Lieut.-Colonel W.D., V.C., The Queen's (Royal West Surrey
 Regt.)

Gimba, No.3 Serjeant No.1, Battery, Nigeria Regt.
 Jibberim, No.80 Acting Bombardier, No.1 Battery, Nigeria Regt.
 Kai Kerift, No.50 Gunner, No.2 Battery, Nigeria Regt.
 Musa Bagendi No.2874 Bombardier No.2 Battery, Nigeria Regt.
 Kato, Serjeant, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Moma Jima, No.5304 Company Serjeant Major, 1st Battalion, Nigeria
 Regiment

Manassara, Serjeant, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Jimba, No.6600 Lance-Corporal, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Manu Zozo, No.5681 Serjeant, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Babelli, No.58 Serjeant, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Esar Saye, No.7260 Corporal, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Awutu Kano, No.7256 Private, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Momadu Katagum, No.5972 Private, 1st Battalion, " "
 Salt Tassawa, No.5475 Lance-Corporal, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Jmoru Jni, No.6648 Private, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Ademuro Rogo, No.6470 Acting Lande-Corporal, 1st Battalion, Nigeria
 Regiment

Musa Zonga, No.6244 Corporal, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Jsa Kano, No.6023 Company Serjeant-Major, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.

Amadu

Amadu, No.5504 Serjeant, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Jimbi Gombe, No.5730 Private, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Adamu Kano, No.7206 Corporal, 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Lowan Yola, No.3936 Serjeant, 2nd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Shehu Kolo, No.4079 Lance Corporal, 2nd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Momadu Kukawa, Company Serjeant-Major, 2nd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Sambo Kano, Company Serjeant-Major, 2nd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Samanu, No.3087 Company Serjeant-Major, 2nd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Osuman Yola, No. 381 Corporal, 2nd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Moma Kano, No.4772 Serjeant, 2nd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Makinde Abeokuta, No.3509 Serjeant, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Dangana Arogunga, No.3606 Lance-Corporal, 3rd Batt., Nigeria Regt.
 Moma Zaria, Private, 3rd Batt., Nigeria Regt.
 Ali Kano, Private, 3rd Battalion, " "
 Moma Fika, Private, 3rd Battalion, " "
 Sumanu Sokoto, No.173 Private, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Alabi Jbadan, No.4668 Private, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Adegbite Offa, No.6310 Serjeant, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Salumi Yola, No.5489 Serjeant, " " "
 Sumanu, No.3087 Company Serjeant-Major, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Tookuru Giri, No.2546 Serjeant, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Jbrihim Kano, No.82 Serjeant, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Jegedi Akure, No.4277 Private, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Ojo Jbadan, No.4317 Private, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Gama Bida, No.3364 Serjeant, 3rd Battalion, " "
 Dodo, No.5544 Lance-Corporal, " " "
 Jbrihim Kano, No.4282 Serjeant, " " "
 Agbi Owo, No.4330 Lance-Corporal, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Ojo Jbadan, No.539 Regimental Serjeant-Major, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria
 Regiment
 Alabi Shebi, No.6332 Bugler, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Ojo Ogbomosho, No.4867 Lance-Corporal, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Egbi Makindl, No.7205 Corporal, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.

Jesufu Adeokuta, No. 4748 Private, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Cobina, No. 1318 Company Serjeant-Major, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Shado Yola, No. 3233 Lance-Corporal, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Watinbera, No. 7340 Private, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Dania, Reservist Serjeant, 3rd Battalion, " "
 Jbadan, No. 2425 Company Serjeant-Major, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Olabi Offa, No. 6330 Corporal, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Alao Jbadan, No. 2293 Serjeant, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Ajala, No. 2512 Serjeant, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Koma Shira, No. 5015 Corporal, 3rd Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Adeladan, No. 3690 Serjeant, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Mamadu Yawuri, No. 371 Lance-Corporal, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Oke Modeke, No. 4026 Lance-Corporal, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Musa Damajara, No. 3530 Serjeant, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Amusan Jbadan, No. 2986 Corporal, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Shitu Jbadan, No. 4337 Lance-Corporal, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Belo Jbadan, No. 5921 Lance-Corporal, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Musa Bauchi, No. 4826 Private, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Tanko Zaria, No. 4416 Private, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Asleke Jbadan, No. 5732 Private, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Awudu Fulani, No. 6024 Private, 4th Battalion, " "
 Garuba Hadejia, No. 6287 Private, 4th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Sanni Zozo, No. 908, Lance-Corporal, 5th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Sadicko, No. 811 Private, 5th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Chiroma, No. 892 Serjeant, 5th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Adu Sakadade, No. 1235 Private, 5th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Jorri No. 1926 Private, 5th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Arri Margi, No. 1525 Private, 5th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Dermi Kushi, No. 1446 Private, 5th Battalion, Nigeria Regt.
 Momadu Kukawa, No. 1372, Private, 5th Battalion, " "
 Moma Bauchi, No. 1285 Private, 5th Battalion, " "
 Hassan No. 3233 Serjeant, Nigeria Police.